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VHD Image Download Via Browser

sigma MEDIUM SigmaHQ
T1587.001
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may use a browser to download a VHD image to exfiltrate malicious payloads or establish a persistent presence. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential lateral movement or data exfiltration attempts leveraging compromised browser sessions.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: VHD Image Download Via Browser
id: 8468111a-ef07-4654-903b-b863a80bbc95
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of ".vhd"/".vhdx" files by browser processes.
    Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk ".vhd" files to encapsulate payloads and evade security controls.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
    - https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lazarus-vhd-ransomware/36559/
    - https://securelist.com/lazarus-on-the-hunt-for-big-game/97757/
author: frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'
date: 2021-10-25
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\maxthon.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\safari.exe'
            - '\seamonkey.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
            - '\whale.exe'
        # We don't use "endswith" to also match with ADS logs and ".vhdx". Example: "TargetFilename: C:\Users\xxx\Downloads\windows.vhd:Zone.Identifier"
        TargetFilename|contains: '.vhd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate downloads of ".vhd" files would also trigger this
level: medium

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where (TargetFilePath endswith "\\brave.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\chrome.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\firefox.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\iexplore.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\maxthon.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\MicrosoftEdge.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\msedge.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\msedgewebview2.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\opera.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\safari.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\seamonkey.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\vivaldi.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\whale.exe") and TargetFileName contains ".vhd"

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_vhd_download_via_browsers.yml