This hypothesis targets the execution of the VxPhoenix927 malware variant, which may indicate an adversary attempting to establish a foothold or perform initial access activities within the environment. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to identify low-severity threats that might otherwise evade broader behavioral detections, ensuring timely containment of known malicious payloads.
rule VxPhoenix927
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E8 00 00 5E 81 C6 [2] BF 00 01 B9 04 00 F3 A4 E8 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
java.util.zip library or a third-party compression utility that uses a non-standard internal header structure matching the VxPhoenix927 signature.
lib/ or plugins/ directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\Apache Tomcat 9\lib\*.jar) where the file extension is .jar or .war, and the parent process is a known Java runtime (java.exe, javaw.exe).HxD, 010 Editor, or a custom Python script using lief) to modify a PE executable in a staging environment, creating a temporary file that retains the original section layout but with modified headers that trigger the YARA rule.
C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Local\Temp\, C:\builds\, C:\workspace\) where the file was created within the last 15 minutes and the parent process is an editor or build tool (hxd.exe, python.exe, msbuild.exe).VxPhoenix927 rule, particularly if the rule targets specific magic bytes or section names.
.vbk, .vib, .ckp, or .dedup located