This detection rule identifies the creation of a suspicious web shell named ajn.asp, which adversaries often deploy to establish persistent access and execute commands on compromised web servers for post-exploitation activities. The SOC team should proactively hunt for this artifact in Azure Sentinel because web shells are frequently used as initial footholds that can lead to lateral movement, data exfiltration, or ransomware deployment if left undetected.
rule webshell_asp_ajn {
meta:
description = "Web Shell - file ajn.asp"
license = "Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE"
author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
date = "2014/01/28"
score = 70
hash = "aaafafc5d286f0bff827a931f6378d04"
id = "393e738a-b4c2-5630-a55f-c3caee4ff75e"
strings:
$s1 = "seal.write \"Set WshShell = CreateObject(\"\"WScript.Shell\"\")\" & vbcrlf" fullword
$s6 = "seal.write \"BinaryStream.SaveToFile \"\"c:\\downloaded.zip\"\", adSaveCreateOve"
condition:
all of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Web Shell - file ajn.asp detection rule, including recommended filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Backup Script Execution
ajn.asp by convention, located in C:\inetpub\wwwroot\logs\.C:\inetpub\wwwroot\logs\ and the process name is vbrsvc.exe (Veeam) or powershell.exe running under a specific service account (e.g., DOMAIN\BackupSvc).Scenario: Legacy Reporting Dashboard Deployment
ajn.asp used for rendering charts, which is updated via a scheduled CI/CD pipeline (e.g., Azure DevOps or Jenkins) every Monday at 02:00 AM.ajn.asp modifications occurring between 01:30 and 02:30 UTC on Mondays, provided the user context is the CI service account (e.g., DOMAIN\CI-Build-User).Scenario: Third-Party Analytics Integration
ajn.asp