This detection rule identifies the creation of a suspicious web shell named hkmjj.asp, which adversaries often deploy to establish persistent remote access and execute commands on compromised web servers. Proactive hunting for this artifact in Azure Sentinel is critical because web shells serve as a primary foothold for attackers to pivot within the network, exfiltrate sensitive data, or escalate privileges before triggering broader alerts.
rule webshell_caidao_shell_hkmjj {
meta:
description = "Web Shell - file hkmjj.asp"
license = "Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE"
author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
date = "2014/01/28"
score = 70
hash = "e7b994fe9f878154ca18b7cde91ad2d0"
id = "393e738a-b4c2-5630-a55f-c3caee4ff75e"
strings:
$s6 = "codeds=\"Li#uhtxhvw+%{{%,#@%{%#wkhq#hydo#uhtxhvw+%knpmm%,#hqg#li\" " fullword
condition:
all of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Web Shell - file hkmjj.asp detection rule, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Backup Script Execution
SYSTEM or BackupService account creates hkmjj.asp as a transient logging artifact during nightly maintenance windows.Source User is NT SYSTEM, BackupService, or a known service account, and the file creation time falls within the defined maintenance window (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC).Scenario: CI/CD Pipeline Artifact Deployment
BuildAgent) temporarily creates hkmjj.asp in the C:\inetpub\wwwroot directory as part of a staging verification step before promoting it to production.Process Name is jenkins.exe, azagentworker.exe, or msbuild.exe, and the file path matches the deployment staging directory (e.g., \Staging\).Scenario: Third-Party Analytics Module Installation
hkmjj.asp as a standard entry point for tracking scripts, which remains static and does not exhibit shell-like behavior (e.g