The detection identifies potential Wild Neutron APT activity through the execution of a suspicious file hash, indicating possible adversary persistence or data exfiltration. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate early-stage APT operations before significant damage occurs.
YARA Rule
rule WildNeutron_Sample_7
{
meta:
description = "Wild Neutron APT Sample Rule - file a14d31eb965ea8a37ebcc3b5635099f2ca08365646437c770212d534d504ff3c"
author = "Florian Roth"
reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/research/71275/wild-neutron-economic-espionage-threat-actor-returns-with-new-tricks/"
date = "2015-07-10"
score = 60
hash = "a14d31eb965ea8a37ebcc3b5635099f2ca08365646437c770212d534d504ff3c"
strings:
$s0 = "checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s" fullword ascii /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings */ /* score: '24.00' */
$s1 = "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey failed" fullword ascii /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings */ /* score: '23.00' */
$s2 = "usage: %s [-ehR] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level] [-u umask]" fullword ascii /* score: '23.00' */
$s3 = "%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s" fullword ascii /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings */ /* score: '23.00' */
$s4 = "clapi32.dll" fullword ascii /* score: '21.00' */
$s5 = "Connection from %s port %d" fullword ascii /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings */ /* score: '17.00' */
$s6 = "/usr/etc/ssh_known_hosts" fullword ascii /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings */ /* score: '16.00' */
$s7 = "Version: %s - %s %s %s %s" fullword ascii /* score: '16.00' */
$s8 = "[-] connect()" fullword ascii /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings */ /* score: '13.00' */
$s9 = "/bin/sh /usr/etc/sshrc" fullword ascii /* score: '12.42' */
$s10 = "kexecdhs.c" fullword ascii /* score: '12.00' */
$s11 = "%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s" fullword ascii /* score: '11.00' */
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 5000KB and all of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 12 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: Legitimate System Update via Windows Update
Description: A file matching the hash is detected during a Windows Update process, which is a common method for deploying system patches.
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "wuauclt.exe" or process.parent.name == "svchost.exe"
Scenario: Scheduled Job for Log Collection
Description: A scheduled task runs a script that uses a file with the same hash as the rule, such as a log aggregation tool like logrotate or rsyslog.
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "logrotate", process.name == "rsyslog", or process.name == "syslog-ng"
Scenario: Admin Task Using PowerShell for Configuration Management
Description: An administrator uses PowerShell to configure system settings, and the script uses a file with the same hash as the rule.
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "powershell.exe" and user.name == "Administrator" or process.args contains "Configure-System"
Scenario: Antivirus Quarantine File
Description: A file with the same hash is detected as a quarantined file by an antivirus solution, which is then moved to a temporary directory.
Filter/Exclusion: file.path contains "Quarantine" or file.path contains "Temp"
Scenario: Legitimate Software Installation via MSI
Description: A legitimate software package (e.g., Microsoft SQL Server) is being installed, and the installation process uses a file with the same hash.
Filter/Exclusion: file.name contains "sqlservr.exe" or file.name contains "setup.exe" and process.name == "msiexec.exe"