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WMI Persistence - Security

sigma MEDIUM SigmaHQ
T1546.003
imRegistry
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T02:50:08Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may use WMI event filters and command line event consumers to establish persistent access and execute arbitrary code on compromised systems. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential long-term persistence mechanisms used by advanced threats.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: WMI Persistence - Security
id: f033f3f3-fd24-4995-97d8-a3bb17550a88
related:
    - id: 0b7889b4-5577-4521-a60a-3376ee7f9f7b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397
    - https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin oscd.community
date: 2017-08-22
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        ObjectType: 'WMI Namespace'
        ObjectName|contains: 'subscription'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)
level: medium

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imRegistry
| where RegistryKey contains "subscription"

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_wmi_persistence.yml