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Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File

sigma CRITICAL SigmaHQ
T1047T1021.002
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may leverage a WMI DLL hijack by deploying a malicious wbemcomn.dll file in the C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\ directory to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential DLL hijacking attacks that could compromise system integrity and persistence.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File
id: 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where TargetFilePath =~ "System" and TargetFileName endswith "\\wbem\\wbemcomn.dll"

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml