yodasProtectorV1031AshkbizDanehkar

Hunt Hypothesis

This hypothesis targets the execution of the YodasProtector malware variant, a known tool often used for process injection and memory manipulation to evade detection. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify low-severity compromises early, preventing potential lateral movement or privilege escalation before the adversary establishes a foothold in the environment.

YARA Rule

rule yodasProtectorV1031AshkbizDanehkar
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? BB 55 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 8F 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 82 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 B8 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 AB 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 83 FB 55 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 75 2E E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? C3 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 81 ED 74 72 42 00 8B D5 81 C2 C3 72 42 00 52 E8 01 00 00 00 C3 C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 0E 00 00 00 E8 D1 FF FF FF C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 CC C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 4B CC C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 DB B9 3F A9 42 00 81 E9 6E 73 42 00 8B D5 81 C2 6E 73 42 00 8D 3A 8B F7 33 C0 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 17 00 00 00 90 90 90 E9 98 2E 00 00 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 43 CC C3 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: A developer or DevOps engineer is compiling a custom C/C++ application using the Yodas Protector obfuscator to protect proprietary source code or license keys before deployment. The resulting executable contains the specific byte patterns and strings defined in the yodasProtectorV1031AshkbizDanehkar rule.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude files located in standard build directories (e.g., C:\Projects\, D:\Builds\, C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\) or files with extensions like .exe that are signed by known internal code-signing certificates. Additionally, exclude paths containing keywords like build, dist, or output.

• Scenario: An IT administrator is deploying a new version of a legacy internal tool that was previously obfuscated with Yodas Protector for IP protection. The new binary is copied to the network share \\fileserver\apps\ and then pushed to endpoints via Group Policy or SCCM, triggering the YARA scan on the file system.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude files located in known application installation directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\InternalTools\, C:\Program Files (x86)\LegacyApps\) or files that have a valid digital signature from the organization’s internal CA. You can also whitelist specific file names or hashes if the tool is static.

• Scenario: A security team is performing a red team exercise or a vulnerability assessment where they deploy a custom implant or payload that has been obfuscated using Yodas Protector to evade basic AV signatures. The implant is dropped in a temporary directory or user profile during the engagement.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude files located in common red team staging directories (e.g., C:\Users\Public\, `C:\Windows\