Detection rules, YARA signatures, and KQL hunting queries for Azure Sentinel
Type
Severity
Tactic
Tags
Azure-Sentinel source
T1059T1027T1140
imProcessCreate

'Identifies instances of a base64 encoded PE file header seen in the process command line parameter. To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://ak

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1110
imAuthentication

'Identifies evidence of brute force activity against a user based on multiple authentication failures and at least one successful authentication within a given time window. Note that the query does no

credential-theftmicrosoftofficial
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerCheck__DrWatson

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerCheck__GlobalFlags

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerCheck__PEB

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerCheck__QueryInfo

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerCheck__RemoteAPI

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerException__ConsoleCtrl

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerException__SetConsoleCtrl

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerException__UnhandledFilter

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerHiding__Active

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerHiding__Thread

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerOutput__String

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerPattern__RDTSC

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerTiming__PerformanceCounter

community
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: DebuggerTiming__Ticks

community
Azure-Sentinel source
T1569T1003
SecurityAlertimProcessCreate

'This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity. Th

lateral-movementmicrosoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1071.001

'Identifies callouts to Discord CDN addresses for risky file extensions. This detection will trigger when a callout for a risky file is made to a discord server that has only been seen once in your en

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1496

'Identifies IP addresses that may be performing DNS lookups associated with common currency mining pools. This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom s

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1048

'Identifies IP addresses performing DNS lookups associated with common ToR proxies. This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports th

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1110T1556

This rule identifies a source that repeatedly fails to authenticate to a web service (HTTP response code 403). This may indicate a [brute force](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute-force_attack) or [c

credential-theftmicrosoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1568T1008

'This creates an incident in the event a client generates excessive amounts of DNS queries for non-existent domains. This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in

backdoormicrosoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1564
imProcessCreate

'Identifies malware that has been hidden in the recycle bin. To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1547
imProcessCreate

'This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-m

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1072T1570

'This detection highlights executables deployed to hosts via either the Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies. These policies apply to all hosts or Domain Controllers and best practice

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1568T1008
DnsEvents

'Identifies clients with a high NXDomain count which could be indicative of a DGA (cycling through possible C2 domains where most C2s are not live). Alert is generated when a new IP address is seen (b

backdoormicrosoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1110
imAuthentication

'This query searches for failed attempts to log in from more than 15 various users within a 5 minute timeframe from the same source. This is a potential indication of a password spray attack To use t

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1485T1036

'This detection looks for command line parameters associated with the use of Sysinternals sdelete (https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete) to delete multiple files on a host's C dri

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1018
imProcessCreate

'Identifies the host and account that executed AdFind by hash and filename in addition to common and unique flags that are used by many threat actors in discovery. To use this analytics rule, make sur

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1485

'This query looks for the Sdelete process being run recursively after being deployed to a host via GPO. Attackers could use this technique to deploy Sdelete to multiple host and delete data on them.

microsoftofficial
SEH v3
yara low
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: SEH__v3

community
SEH v4
yara low
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: SEH__v4

community
SEH vba
yara low
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: SEH__vba

community
SEH vectored
yara low
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: SEH__vectored

community
Azure-Sentinel source
T1078T1098
imAuthentication

'Identifies IPs with failed attempts to sign in to one or more disabled accounts signed in successfully to another account. To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalizat

microsoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1195T1059T1546
imFileEvent

Identifies SolarWinds SUNBURST and SUPERNOVA backdoor file hash IOCs in File Events To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimFileEven

backdoormicrosoftofficial
Azure-Sentinel source
T1059T1543
imProcessCreate

Identifies suspicious child processes of SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll that may be evidence of the SUNBURST backdoor References: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasiv

backdoormicrosoftofficial
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: ThreadControl__Context

community
ThreatFox source
DnsEvents

Hunt package for 108 IOCs associated with ClearFake

iocjs-clearfakethreatfox
ThreatFox: KongTuke IOCs
ioc-hunt high
ThreatFox source
DnsEventsUrlClickEvents

Hunt package for 2 IOCs associated with KongTuke

iocjs-kongtukethreatfox
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceFileEventsDeviceNetworkEventsDnsEventsUrlClickEvents

Hunt package for 31 IOCs associated with Unknown malware

iocthreatfoxunknown
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEvents

Hunt package for 2 IOCs associated with AdaptixC2

aptiocthreatfoxwin-adaptix_c2
ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs
ioc-hunt high
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEvents

Hunt package for 2 IOCs associated with AsyncRAT

backdooriocthreatfoxwin-asyncrat
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEvents

Hunt package for 14 IOCs associated with Cobalt Strike

cobalt-strikeiocthreatfoxwin-cobalt_strike
ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs
ioc-hunt high
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEvents

Hunt package for 3 IOCs associated with Havoc

iocthreatfoxwin-havoc
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEvents

Hunt package for 4 IOCs associated with Meterpreter

iocthreatfoxwin-meterpreter
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEvents

Hunt package for 2 IOCs associated with NetSupportManager RAT

backdooriocthreatfoxwin-netsupportmanager_rat
ThreatFox source
DnsEvents

Hunt package for 4 IOCs associated with Quasar RAT

backdooriocthreatfoxwin-quasar_rat
ThreatFox: Remcos IOCs
ioc-hunt high
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEventsDnsEvents

Hunt package for 9 IOCs associated with Remcos

iocthreatfoxwin-remcos
ThreatFox source
DeviceFileEventsUrlClickEvents

Hunt package for 4 IOCs associated with SocksProxyGo

iocthreatfoxwin-socksproxygo
ThreatFox: XWorm IOCs
ioc-hunt high
ThreatFox source
CommonSecurityLogDeviceNetworkEventsDnsEvents

Hunt package for 5 IOCs associated with XWorm

iocthreatfoxwin-xworm
URLhaus source
CommonSecurityLogDnsEvents

Hunt package for 46 malicious URLs tagged as 32-bit

iocurlhaus
URLhaus source
CommonSecurityLogDnsEvents

Hunt package for 32 malicious URLs tagged as ACRStealer

infostealeriocurlhaus
URLhaus source
CommonSecurityLogDnsEvents

Hunt package for 5 malicious URLs tagged as elf

iocurlhaus
URLhaus source
CommonSecurityLogDnsEvents

Hunt package for 4 malicious URLs tagged as malware_download

iocurlhaus
URLhaus source
CommonSecurityLogDnsEvents

Hunt package for 2 malicious URLs tagged as mirai

iocurlhaus
URLhaus source
CommonSecurityLogDnsEvents

Hunt package for 9 malicious URLs tagged as Mozi

iocurlhaus
Azure-Sentinel source
T1078
imAuthentication

'This query searches for successful user logins from different countries within 3 hours. To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAu

microsoftofficial
WindowsPE
yara low
Yara-Rules source

YARA rule: WindowsPE

community
SigmaHQ source
T1087.001T1087.002T1482T1069.001T1069.002T1059.001
imFileEvent

Detects default file names outputted by the BloodHound collection tool SharpHound

SigmaHQ source
T1059.003T1021.004T1219
imProcessCreate

Detects the OpenEDR ssh-shellhost.exe spawning a command shell (cmd.exe) or PowerShell with PTY (pseudo-terminal) capabilities. This may indicate remote command execution through OpenEDR's remote mana

backdoorlateral-movementpowershell
SigmaHQ source
T1105T1570T1219
imFileEvent

Detects the creation of potentially suspicious files by OpenEDR's ITSMService process. The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Pr

backdoor
SigmaHQ source
T1574.001
DeviceImageLoadEvents

Detects image load events of system control panel items (.cpl) from uncommon or non-system locations that may indicate DLL sideloading or other abuse techniques.

SigmaHQ source
T1036
imProcessCreate

Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.

SigmaHQ source
T1036.005
imFileEvent

Detects the creation of an executable with a system process name in folders other than the system ones (System32, SysWOW64, etc.). It is highly recommended to perform an initial baseline before using

SigmaHQ source
T1195.002T1557
imProcessCreate

Detects suspicious child process creation by the Notepad++ updater process (gup.exe). This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware.

exploit
SigmaHQ source
T1195.002T1557
imFileEvent

Detects when the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe) creates files in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware or unwar

exploit
SigmaHQ source
T1083
imProcessCreate

Detects usage of "getcap" binary. This is often used during recon activity to determine potential binaries that can be abused as GTFOBins or other.

SigmaHQ source
T1574.001
imFileEvent

Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes. Phantom DLL hijacking invol

backdoor
SigmaHQ source
T1548T1554
imProcessCreate

Detects the use of the 'setcap' utility to set the 'setgid' capability (cap_setgid) on a binary file. This capability allows a non privileged process to make arbitrary manipulations of group IDs (GIDs

backdoor
SigmaHQ source
T1548T1554
imProcessCreate

Detects the use of the 'setcap' utility to set the 'setuid' capability (cap_setuid) on a binary file. This capability allows a non privileged process to make arbitrary manipulations of user IDs (UIDs)

backdoor
SigmaHQ source
T1553.004
imProcessCreate

Detects installation of suspicious packages using system installation utilities

SigmaHQ source
T1562.001
imRegistry

Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can acc

credential-theftlateral-movement
SigmaHQ source
T1218T1105
imFileEvent

Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution. Adversaries may leverage legitimate applica

SigmaHQ source
T1059T1203
imProcessCreate

Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe. ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromise

SigmaHQ source
T1127T1105T1133
imFileEvent

Detects instances where the ArcGIS Server process ArcSOC.exe, which hosts REST services running on an ArcGIS server, creates a file with suspicious file type, indicating that it may be an executable,

SigmaHQ source
T1087.001
imProcessCreate

Detects enumeration of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.

backdoor
SigmaHQ source
T1220
DeviceImageLoadEvents

Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). It could be a

evasionwmi
SigmaHQ source
T1548.002T1546.001
imRegistry

Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 3

evasionpersistence